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Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 highlighted the 
immense costs to the taxpayer of government responses to 
financial crises. Looking back at the last four decades, the 
median increase in public debt following financial crises from 
1970 through 2011 in all countries is estimated to be about 
seven per cent of GDP. The range of public costs is very large, 
as some of these crises, such as Indonesia’s 1997 and Iceland’s 
2008 crises, are estimated to be over 40 per cent of GDP 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2012: 17-19). What explains the varia-
tion in the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises?
Previous research has identified electoral competitive-
ness as a key driver of which policies governments pursue 
to address financial crises (Rosas, 2006, 2009a), with elec-
torally competitive governments making choices that lead 
to lower fiscal costs (Keefer, 2007). These governments 
need to appeal to cost-conscious voters, rather than just 
banking interests who can provide them with rents, in order 
to stay in office. The view that non-electorally accountable, 
cronyistic relationships between banks and policymakers 
are a cause of crises and costly bailouts was widely held in 
the wake of the 1990s Asian financial crisis (Grossman and 
Woll, 2014: 578).
The Global Financial Crisis raises some questions about 
this approach. Though commonly referred to as “global”, 
the crisis primarily struck highly electorally competitive 
democracies in Europe and North America. Yet there is 
considerable variation across countries in the policy choices 
that these countries have made and the fiscal costs that have 
materialized so far from them (see Laeven and Valencia, 
2012). Using Gelman and Basbøll’s (2014) terminology, 
recent events are both strongly anomalous in light of estab-
lished theory and immutable–though the exact costs of 
these crises likely has not been settled, their wide range is 
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well understood. As such, recent events should bring us to 
reconsider previous hypotheses. When viewed from a 
methodological perspective that emphasizes the impor-
tance of predictive accuracy to “at least in part verify claims 
about causal structure”, and which uses out-of-sample fore-
cast accuracy as the “gold standard of model assessment” 
(Beck et al., 2000: 21-22), the recent divergence in crisis 
costs suggests that previous theories are less robust than 
initially thought. This motivates us to reconsider the verac-
ity of approaches that see electoral competitiveness as a 
strong constraint on the fiscal costs of responding to 
crises.
In this paper, we re-evaluate the link between electoral 
competitiveness and bailout costs by examining the strength 
of the empirical foundations upon which this work is based. 
We update core findings published by Keefer (2007) in the 
journal International Organization. This work used data on 
the fiscal costs of financial crises from Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003) which covered crises from 1975 through 
2000. Their data is part of an irregular, but ongoing, compi-
lation of information on financial crises that has largely 
been done by staff at the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank over almost two decades (Caprio 
et al., 2005; Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, 1997, 2002; 
Honohan and Klingebiel, 2000, 2003; Laeven and Valencia, 
2008, 2010, 2012; Lindgren et al., 1996). Researchers stud-
ying financial crises and related policy issues have relied 
heavily upon the related data sets (a brief sample includes 
Alt et al., 2014; Bush et al., 2014; Gandrud, 2013; Ha and 
Kang, 2015; Jordana and Rosas, 2014; Keefer, 2007; 
Kleibl, 2013; Montinola, 2003; Pepinsky, 2012; Rosas, 
2006, 2009a; Wibbels and Roberts, 2010). In fact, almost 
all recent cross-national research on some aspect of finan-
cial crises have relied on either the IMF/World Bank data 
set or another data set by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), 
which is itself heavily based on prior versions of the IMF/
World Bank data.1
When we update Keefer’s original analysis with the 
most recently revised data, we do not find support for the 
initial electoral competitiveness findings either within or 
outside of the original sample.
Our paper is interesting for researchers studying the 
political economy of financial crises generally as it high-
lights measurement issues that plague key data sets, but are 
rarely addressed, let alone corrected for, in empirical work. 
As such researchers often use measurements from crises 
that are ongoing at the time of data collection, while the 
final costs can take many years to be settled. In this paper, 
we show that using data for ongoing crises introduces 
measurement error that requires some adjustment on the 
part of the researcher. Yet we know of no previous political 
economy research that addresses, let alone attempts to cor-
rect for this problem. Furthermore, measurement error may 
be systematically and theoretically interesting. Initial meas-
urement errors may be related to political institutions, as 
politicians who face competitive elections have strong 
incentives to use policies that shift costs into the future. 
This could confound attempts to identify causal relation-
ships between fiscal costs and political institutions, espe-
cially if not explicitly addressed.
Although the malleability of accounting fiscal costs of 
financial crisis make this a particularly important issue in 
this sub-discipline, paying closer attention to revisions in 
economic data is an issue with broader relevance and appli-
cability in political science. Doing so can help critically 
reexamine previously established findings. For example, 
Kayser and Leininger (2015) examine economic data revi-
sions and election forecasts. They find that voters are influ-
enced more by reported, though inaccurate economic 
performance data rather than economic reality, which had 
been the prior widely accepted quantity in the literature.
In this paper, we first briefly re-evaluate the literature on 
the relationship between electoral competitiveness and the 
costs of responding to financial crises. We then describe 
revisions that have been made to the core fiscal costs data 
set and use this corrected data to update Keefer’s (2007) 
key analyses.
The study of the fiscal costs of financial 
crises
There are surprisingly few studies that explore why fiscal 
costs of crises vary across countries. In his study of 
responses to 46 banking crises over the period 1976–1998, 
which largely uses data from Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2000), Rosas (2006) argues that governments have two 
choices when dealing with a financial crisis. They can 
decide to bailout banks, in which case the costs to the tax-
payer are high. They can also choose “Bagehot” policies 
that tend to minimize taxpayer costs. He classifies seven 
policy types from Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) accord-
ing to whether they fit the “Bagehot” narrative, such as the 
provision of bank liquidity, recapitalization, and explicit 
guarantees. He argues that democracies are more likely to 
engage in “Bagehot” policies. The key mechanism in 
democracies is electoral competition. In later work, Rosas 
(2009a) builds on this approach by providing a case study 
contrasting the bailouts Mexican banks received under 
autocratic governments in the early 1990s with the higher 
losses shareholders bore in democratic Argentina and a 
more general statistical study of policies to address finan-
cial crises in Latin America. Looking specifically at fiscal 
costs with data from Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), 
Keefer (2007) argues that politicians facing strong removal 
pressures are not only less likely to choose bailout-type 
policies, but also likely to actually spend less when respond-
ing to financial crises.
This work has been widely cited in the literature on 
financial crises (for example, see Culpepper and Reinke, 
2014; Gorton, 2012; Ha and Kang, 2015; Kang, 2014; 
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Rosas, 2009a). The approach is part of a larger and growing 
literature on the general links between political institutions, 
particularly electoral competition and regime type, and 
politicians’ responsiveness to their constituents and the 
quality of government generally (see Kayser and Lindstädt, 
2015: and the Supplementary Materials).
The literature on electoral competition and crises starts 
with the assumption that politicians are inclined to provide 
taxpayer funded bailouts to banks in order to earn rents 
from these banks. Electoral competition pushes back 
against this motivation. Politicians in electorally competi-
tive systems have to limit bailouts in order to avoid being 
removed from office by cost-conscious taxpaying voters. A 
foundational assumption in this approach is that voters 
immediately observe bailout costs and can make informed 
decisions based on this information.
However, one can question this assumption. Many pol-
icy responses to financial crises are hard for citizens to 
observe and have costs that are very difficult to accurately 
predict. Responses such as guarantees, liquidity assistance, 
and supporting public asset management companies, create 
contingent liabilities that are only realized in the future if 
some event happens. It is only at a future time that the 
government needs to incur new debt or raise taxes if, for 
example, a bank is unable to pay its publicly guaranteed 
liabilities. Conversely, and perhaps less frequently, govern-
ments may discover that a bailed out bank is in better shape 
than anticipated, causing initial cost estimates to be low-
ered. This happened in Germany in 2011 when nationalized 
lender HRE’s bailout was found to have been overstated in 
an accounting error by 55 billion Euros (Reuters, 2011). 
For all of these reasons, initial estimates of how much 
policies used to respond to financial crises cost are often 
inaccurate (Woll, 2014: Ch. 1).
The problem for observational studies on the effects of 
political institutions is further complicated by the possibility 
that measurement errors in data collected in the short to 
medium term after the start of a crisis could be endogenous 
to these political institutions. Politicians could use contin-
gent liabilities to incur costs beyond what previous models 
of financial crisis policymaking anticipate. Reinhart and 
Rogoff note that, in principle, cost-conscious citizens wor-
ried about increases in the public debt should notice the use 
of contingent liabilities, or what they term “hidden debt”. 
However, this often does not happen, because “the many 
different margins on which governments can cheat are a sig-
nificant complicating factor” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011: 
1697). If politicians can be easily removed from office by 
cost-conscious voters when they observe debt increases 
caused by expensive bailouts, then politicians have strong 
incentives to use contingent liabilities to assist banks. Doing 
so shifts debt increases into the future, thus helping to fore-
stall incumbents’ removal from office. As such, short- to 
medium-term measurement errors in fiscal costs data may 
even be positively related to electoral competitiveness.
Reassessing previous empirical 
research
Given the strong possibility of measurement error in early 
fiscal cost measurements, how robust to updated data is 
Keefer’s claim that there is “robust evidence that countries 
exhibiting competitive elections make significantly fewer 
fiscal transfers to insolvent banks” (Keefer, 2007: 607)? In 
this section we first discuss updates made by Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) to the IMF/World Bank fiscal costs data. 
We then compare these updates to data Keefer used in his 
original research, both in terms of particular revisions and 
how the distributions of fiscal costs differ (or do not) 
between high and low electorally competitive countries. 
Finally, we use the new data to update Keefer’s key statisti-
cal model. The updated estimates suggest that electoral 
competitiveness has no impact on the ultimate fiscal costs 
of responding to financial crises either in or out of the origi-
nal sample.
Updating measurements of fiscal costs from 
financial crises
Keefer based his dependent variable on the fiscal costs of 
responding to financial crisis as a percentage of gross 
domestic product recorded by Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003). The Honohan and Kingebiel data set covered 40 cri-
ses from 1975 through 2000. While a few developed coun-
tries appear in the data set, such as Japan, some Nordic 
countries, and the United States, most are developing coun-
tries. This is because crises predominately occurred in 
developing countries during this time period. The data set is 
based on a frequently, though irregularly, updated data set 
maintained by staffers at the IMF and World Bank. The 
most recent version available is Laeven and Valencia (2012).
The Supplementary Material provides an overview of 
the data set’s entire chronology, which includes more infor-
mation on the exact sample Keefer used. It also includes a 
discussion of the sampling criteria and crisis costs defini-
tions used in the waves we examine. The sampling criteria 
and definitions are generally the same across the versions.
Figure 1 shows the difference in the fiscal costs meas-
ured by Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) where they both have same set of observa-
tions as in the original data set; that is, where they have 
information recorded in the same country–crisis start year. 
It is reasonable to assume that Laeven and Valencia’s 
(2012) data more accurately estimates these costs because 
their measurements were made later: there was more time 
for the fiscal costs of contingent liabilities to be revealed 
and other corrections to be made. If this is the case, then 
positive numbers in Figure 1 indicate that measurements of 
policy responses’ fiscal costs in Honohan and Klingebiel’s 
data are underestimated. Negative numbers in Figure 1 
indicate overestimates.
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Although a little under half of the measurements shown 
in Figure 1 were not revised (13 of 28), almost all measure-
ments of fiscal costs that were revised were revised 
upwards, indicating that they were originally underesti-
mated. This is especially true of crises that were labeled by 
Honohan and Klingebiel as “ongoing”. The median revi-
sion for ongoing crises was 5.75 per cent of GDP, compared 
with 0 for completed crises.2 Keefer’s analysis does not 
distinguish between crises classified as “ongoing” and 
those classified as “completed”. However, fiscal cost esti-
mates from only two of the ongoing crises were not later 
revised upwards. Overall, revisions range between -10.2 
and 11 per cent of GDP. Given the relatively small sample 
size and that the full range of fiscal costs in Laeven and 
Valencia’s (2012) data is 0–56.8 per cent of GDP, using the 
original measurements could easily bias estimates of the 
relationship between financial crisis outcomes and elec-
toral competitiveness.
Figure 1 also shows that the vast majority of upward 
revisions occurred in countries Keefer classifies as having 
highly competitive elections.3 Estimates of high electoral 
competitiveness’ downward effect on fiscal costs would 
likely be overestimated using Honohan and Klingebiel’s 
data.
Figure 2 provides a better sense of how the distributions 
of fiscal costs from financial crises differ between the origi-
nal and updated samples for countries with high and low 
electoral competitiveness. In Honohan and Klingebiel’s 
(2003) original sample (top panel) countries with highly 
competitive elections generally have low fiscal costs. 
Countries without competitive elections have costs that are 
almost uniformly distributed between about 0 and slightly 
above 50 per cent of GDP. The middle panel shows the dis-
tribution of costs for crises included in Honohan and 
Klingebiel’s (2003) original sample that Laeven and 
Valencia updated in 2012. Note that there are fewer crises 
than when we used Keefer’s data, because a number of crisis 
start years are different in Laeven and Valencia (2012) and 
Keefer (2007) (see Table 1 in the Supplementary Material 
for details). Due to revisions, the center of the distribution 
Figure 1. Difference in fiscal costs of crisis responses as a percentage of GDP recorded by Laeven and Valencia (2012) and 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).
Labels are ISO two-letter country codes. The labels are at fixed offsets from the real value. Points are jittered to improve readability.
Gray points are labeled as “ongoing” crises in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).
Electoral competitiveness is measured using a transformation of data from Beck et al. (2001: updated in 2012) employed by Keefer (2007). See the 
Supplementary Material for details.
The Philippines (PH) observation in 1983 was not labeled as “ongoing”. The large negative revision appears to be the result of a coding error in 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003). They seem to have attributed the costs of the 1997 Filipino crisis to the 1983 crisis, while also attributing the costs 
of the 1983 crisis to the 1997 crisis. We believe this because in an earlier version of the data set by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), as well as Laeven 
and Valencia (2012) the 1983 crisis is recorded as having a cost of 3 per cent of GDP, while the 1997 crisis is recorded as having costs of 13.2 per 
cent of GDP. Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), however, record the 1983 crisis as having a cost of 13.2 per cent of GDP.
See Table 2 in the Supplementary Material for a complete list of countries included in the distributions and their electoral competitiveness coding.
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for countries with highly competitive elections moves 
upward. There are also more crises in countries with highly 
competitive elections that have very high fiscal costs.
The bottom panel shows the distribution of fiscal costs 
measured by Laeven and Valencia in their full pre-2001 
data set. There is very little difference between the distribu-
tion of fiscal costs in countries with and without competi-
tive elections. In addition to the upward revision of costs in 
competitive election countries, Laeven and Valencia 
include more countries with low electoral competition than 
Honohan and Klingebiel. These additional cases generally 
have relatively low costs.
Updated results
We now turn to updating Keefer’s 2007 empirical results 
with this revised data. We focus on his Model 2 in Table 4. 
He describes this as the research’s “main findings” (Keefer, 
2007: 624). The purpose of many of the paper’s other 
models is to examine the robustness of these results. The 
estimates in our Table 1 come from an ordinary least 
squares regression run in Stata version 12.1. As in Keefer’s 
original specification, we include robust standard errors 
with country clusters. See the Supplementary Material for 
details about the independent variables. Also, see Table 2 in 
the Supplementary Material for the exact country–crises 
included in each model.
In the first model of our Table 1 we reproduce the origi-
nal findings using Keefer’s 39 country data set. Our coef-
ficient point estimates are not exactly the same as the 
original’s, probably due to discrepancies in the independent 
variables discussed in the Supplementary Material. 
However, the estimates’ directions, statistical significance 
and general magnitudes are the same. The R2  is also very 
similar. As in Keefer’s original, this model estimates that 
electoral competitiveness (labeled as in the original as 
Electoral_Comp._33) has a strong negative affect on the 
fiscal costs of responding to financial crises.
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Figure 2. Comparing distributions of the fiscal costs of financial crises (before 2001) in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and Laeven 
and Valencia (2012).
Electoral Competitiveness is measured using a transformation of data from Beck et al. (2001: updated in 2012) employed by Keefer (2007). See the 
Supplementary Material for details.
The top panel shows the distribution of fiscal costs from responding to financial crises as a percentage of GDP recorded in Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003). The Keefer (2007) data set is identical to this, with a few exceptions discussed in the Supplementary Material.
The middle panel shows the distribution of fiscal costs measured in the Laeven and Valencia (2012) data set for crises that are also included in 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003). These cases are the same as those in Figure 1.
The bottom panel shows the distribution of fiscal costs for all crises recorded in Laeven and Valencia (2012) that started before 2001. There are 59 
crises in the full sample compared with 40 in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).
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The second through fourth models in Table 1 consider 
the possibility that the results change when we use Laeven 
and Valencia’s (2012) updated fiscal costs data. In the sec-
ond model we create a dependent variable of fiscal costs in 
country–crisis start years from Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
that match those in Keefer’s data set. We can see that the 
standard error of the coefficient point estimate for electoral 
competitiveness increases substantially. This leads elec-
toral competitiveness to become statistically insignificant. 
Such a result is evidence that Keefer’s key original finding 
was dependent on measurements taken soon after the crises 
in some countries, and before the costs of contingent liabili-
ties had materialized and other corrections had been made.4 
In the third model, we examine if missing data in the origi-
nal data set might also have contributed to Keefer’s results. 
We use all of the fiscal costs data from Laeven and Valencia 
for crises that began before 2001 as our dependent variable. 
The electoral competitiveness coefficient point estimate 
decreases considerably. It is also statistically insignificant. 
Overall, we find no in-sample evidence for a relationship 
between electoral competitiveness and fiscal costs of 
responding to financial crises when using updated data.
In the fourth model from Table 1 we ran the analysis 
using the full Laeven and Valencia sample up to 2012 to 
detect out-of-sample support for the relationship. The elec-
toral competitiveness finding was again statistically insig-
nificant in this model. However, it is important to take these 
results with a grain of salt. A number of the crises near the 
end of their sample were ongoing when Laeven and 
Valencia collected their data and may still turn out to be 
inaccurate. Nonetheless, because most of the recent crises 
were in electorally competitive countries, and because, as 
we have seen, cost measurements tend to increase over 
time, it is likely that analyses with future updated data will 
not find a negative association between electoral competi-
tiveness and fiscal costs in this sample.
Finally, we conducted an additional robustness check to 
examine how the results change when using a more appro-
priate estimation modeling method. Figure 2 shows that the 
distribution of fiscal costs is effectively bounded by 0 and 
100, or 0 and 1 when the variable is transformed from a 
percentage to a proportion. Related to this, the variable is 
highly right-skewed. Ordinary least squares is ill-suited for 
such a dependent variable. Beta regression is a better fit as 
it models the distribution of the dependent variable using 
the beta distribution, which is bounded between 0 and 1 
(Cribari-Neto and Zeileis, 2010; Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 
2004). Table 2 shows results from a beta regression using 
Keefer’s original and Laeven and Valencia’s updated data 
converted to proportions.5 We used Stata 12.1 and the 
betafit function by Buis et al. (2003). We can see that elec-
toral competitiveness remains negative and statistically sig-
nificant with Keefer’s costs data. However, as in the normal 
linear regressions, when we use Laeven and Valencia’s 
updated costs data, the electoral competitiveness finding 
loses statistical significance. The beta regression likely 
gives us more accurate point estimates, but again does not 
indicate any evidence for a relationship between electoral 
competitiveness and costs either in- or out-of-sample when 
using updated data.
Please also see the Supplementary Material for further 
robustness checks running the model with Honohan and 
Klingebiel’s (2003) sample and Laeven and Valencia’s 
(2012) sample excluding Eurozone and European Union 
Table 1. Normal linear regression: updating elections, political instability, and fiscal transfers during financial crises.
Keefer LV-Keefer LV pre-2001 LV Full
ChecksResiduals33 –5.82 –11.56 2.09 1.67
 (7.96) (12.70) (8.24) (6.66)
Electoral Comp._33 –13.20** –12.16 –5.41 –5.38
 (5.56) (12.36) (5.50) (4.79)
Instability_AVG_LAG3 –14.82** –21.73* –12.47* –11.18*
 (6.64) (11.29) (7.07) (6.59)
constant 24.01*** 28.65** 19.22*** 17.99***
 (4.97) (12.46) (5.20) (4.68)
R2 0.27 0.25 0.06 0.05
No. of Countries 33 20 49 76
No. of Clusters 29 19 44 64
* * * < 0.01, * * < 0.5, * < 0.1p p p .
Robust standard errors with country clusters reported in parentheses.
The models use different samples of the dependent variable (fiscal costs of crisis response as a % of GDP).
Independent variable names taken from Keefer’s original. Please see the Supplementary Material for a discussion of the independent variables.
Keefer = Keefer’s (2007) 39 country sample from 1975–2000.
LV-Keefer = Laeven and Valencia (2012) data for observations also in Keefer (2007).
LV All pre-2001 = All Laeven and Valencia (2012) data before 2001.
LV Full = All Laeven and Valencia (2012).
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countries (the bulk of the new countries in the Laeven and 
Valencia’s sample). It should be noted that the null relation-
ship between electoral competitiveness and fiscal costs is 
observed in these sub-samples as well.
3 Conclusion
In this paper we updated a key finding in the political econ-
omy literature on the relationship between political institu-
tions and the fiscal costs of financial crises. The costs of 
financial crises can take years to settle. Data from ongoing 
crises, which in this case appears in Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003) and is used in Keefer (2007), is likely to 
have considerable measurement error. In our replication 
using updated data we found no evidence in support of 
Keefer’s original findings that electoral competitiveness 
constrains the fiscal costs of financial crises. This was true 
both in the original sample, and for other samples that 
included more recent crises. Our research here indicates 
that future work should address possible measurement error 
caused by delayed cost realization in data on the fiscal costs 
of financial crises.
Our paper has highlighted the need for better measures 
of financial crises and their costs. Though we have used 
perhaps the most comprehensive and updated data cur-
rently available, these measures are far from perfect.6
When better measures of financial crises and costs 
are available, future work needs to empirically examine the 
possibility that electoral competitiveness may actually be 
associated with measurement errors and delayed cost 
realization. Incumbents facing reelection could have strong 
incentives to choose policies that create contingent liabili-
ties and push costs into the future, after elections. We are 
unfortunately not able to do this research here. Available 
data largely has been updated for high electorally 
competitive countries. Only Indonesia had both an ongoing 
crisis in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) and low electoral 
competitiveness.
Finally, we would like to stress that both the purpose and 
outcome or our work is to update important findings in the 
political economy of financial crises with the most recently 
revised data, rather than to criticize the original work. The 
original work used the most complete and accurate infor-
mation available at the time. Given that the high likelihood 
that measurements of the fiscal costs of financial crises will 
need to be revised over time, updating results from work 
that tries to understand these costs is particularly important 
when new information becomes available.
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Notes
1. Recent examples of research that use the Reinhart and Rogoff 
data set include Chwieroth and Walter (2013); Gandrud 
(2013, 2014); Kleibl (2013).
2. This finding is important for another reason. Honohan and 
Klingebiel’s (2003) published paper is not clear about how 
they determined the end date of crises. Laeven and Valencia 
(2013), footnote 19, defines the end date of a crisis as when 
real GDP and real credit growth are positive for at least 2 
years, or a maximum of 5 years. The fact that there is no 
average increase in costs for completed crises suggests that 
the measurement of the end date is the same in both datasets.
3. For Figures 1 and 2 a country is labeled as highly electorally 
competitive if its average score is greater than or equal to 0.8 
for the 3 years before and 3 years after the crisis start year. 
Table 2. Beta regression: updating elections, political 
instability, and fiscal transfers during financial crises.
Keefer LV pre-2001 LV Full
ChecksResiduals33 0.20 0.50 0.34
 (0.62) (0.48) (0.43)
Electoral Comp._33 –0.97** –0.46 –0.45
 (0.38) (0.33) (0.28)
Instability_AVG_LAG3 –0.72 –0.29 –0.21
 (0.56) (0.51) (0.46)
mu constant –1.24*** –1.43*** –1.55***
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.28)
ln phi constant 2.19*** 1.97*** 1.98***
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.18)
Number of countries 33 47 73
Number of clusters 29 43 63
* * * < 0.01, * * < 0.5, * < 0.1p p p .
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Models use the dependent variables as labeled in Table 1, though they 
have additionally been converted into proportions from percentages.
Again, independent variable names taken from Keefer’s original. Please 
see the Supplementary Material for a discussion of the independent 
variables.
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Please see the Supplementary Material for details on how 
the electoral competitiveness variable is created and a critical 
evaluation. Note also that only one of the ongoing crises was 
in a less electorally competitive country: Indonesia. Because 
of this we were unable to statistically explore associations 
between cost delays and electoral competitiveness in this 
data, although such work would be an interesting avenue to 
explore when more data is available.
4. Note that we also reran the regression dropping the Philippines, 
which as shown earlier was miscoded in the original data set. 
This did not substantively change the results.
5. Three crises are recorded by Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
as having no fiscal costs: Brazil 1990, Ukraine 1998, and 
Portugal 2008. These are dropped in the beta regressions. We 
also ran zero-inflated beta regressions (Ospina and Ferrari 
2010) on the original cost proportions. This allows us not to 
drop these observations. However, the electoral competitive-
ness results are substantively similar so the results are not 
shown.
6. See Romer and Romer (2014) for a comprehensive critique 
of the present ways of measuring when a crisis begins and 
ends. See also Rosas (2009b) for a dynamic latent trait meas-
ure of banking system fragility in Latin America. Once we 
can accurately time when crises begin and end, further work 
is needed to understand how long it takes for costs to be 
settled.
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